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Introduction
Cable television has changed the way America views the world by
bringing a greater variety of information and events to a vast and grow-
ing audience of citizens. The laws governing this new medium remain
in flux, however, as cable operators, program producers, consumers,
and government officials seek to reconcile their differences. One of the
most difficult issues dividing the parties is the allocation of cable chan-
nels for free public use. Whether such public access is desirable is es-
sentially a question of First Amendment interpretation: would public
access enhance or restrict the freedom of speech?
The foundation for analysis of all freedom of speech issues is the
doctrine of the marketplace of ideas. The doctrine's unifying principle
holds that the search for "truth" is the basic goal of the First Amend-
ment. Truth is said to arise most readily in a system that permits the
free exchange of competing ideas.' Thus, judicial interpretations of the
marketplace doctrine generally prohibit government from interfering
with oral or written expression.2 However, the government may inter-
vene to correct failures of competition in a market of scarce resources,
such as the broadcast media.3 The Fairness Doctrine, which requires
broadcasters to provide fair and balanced coverage of issues of public
importance, is the most obvious example.4
Efforts to create citizen access to broadcast television have been
rejected by the Supreme Court on two grounds. First, the Court found
that Congress intended to provide broadcasters with discretion to de-
termine the content of their programming in accordance with the me-
dia's traditional journalistic role.5 Second, while the Fairness Doctrine
held broadcasters responsible for presenting conflicting viewpoints, no
mechanism insured balanced presentations by private access seekers. 6
1. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 247 (1974).
3. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 383 (1969). "Broadcast" is de-
fined as "communication by wire or radio" and includes television, which is transmission of
pictures by radio. 47 U.S.C. § 153(a)-(b).
4. 47 C.F.R. § 73 (1982). See, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367. While the Fairness
Doctrine appears to restrict the broadcaster's right to freedom of expression, the Supreme
Court has justified the regulation on two grounds. First, the broadcast media are scarce
resources which must be sparingly allocated; those who operate the media do so as public
trustees, charged with the duty to supply the marketplace with ideas. Id. at 389. Second,
television and other electronic media are powerful and pervasive forces, which, if left unreg-
ulated, might be used to manipulate the captive audience which is the American public.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973).
5. Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 116.
6. Id. at 124.
The Court premised its reasoning on the belief that society's search for
truth takes precedence over the individual broadcaster's right to speak
without government interference.7
Whether cable television should be held to the same regulatory
standards as broadcast television has posed difficult problems of policy
and First Amendment interpretation. The cable television industry in-
sists that its medium possesses abundant channel capacity, which ne-
gates the need for government regulation of cable as a scarce medium.8
Proponents of cable access requirements point to cable television's nat-
ural monopoly characteristics which make it likely that one cable com-
pany will maintain exclusive control of all of a given area's cable
channel capacity.9 Furthermore, cable television, like broadcast televi-
sion, is an audio-video medium imbued with a special influence over
human beings.10
This Article contends that public access to cable television is not
only good public policy, but that access is necessary to fulfill funda-
mental goals of the First Amendment freedom of speech. The Article
begins by reviewing the current system of television and cable televi-
sion regulation and interpreting Supreme Court decisions regarding
that system. The Article explains that the Supreme Court permitted ap-
plication of the Fairness Doctrine to the broadcast media in hope that
(1) diverse information would enable the public to discern truth, and
(2) such truth would become the basis for the public's democratic deci-
sions. The Article contends that although the Court's position was con-
sistent with basic First Amendment principles, the Court lacked a clear
7. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391; Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 122.
8. The industry contends that cable television should be granted the same freedom
from public access afforded the print media. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Cable
Television Ass'n at 13-18, Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F.Supp.
976 (D.R.I. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-1800 (Ist Cir. 1984).
9. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 167-200 and accompanying text. Concerned that the public would
not otherwise receive a diversity of views on issues of public importance, the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) since 1970 has required all programming which originates
with the cable operator to conform to the public interest standard of the Fairness Doctrine.
47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1982). The FCC also implemented a system of citizen access to cable
television, but the regulations were struck down by the Supreme Court in 1978 on the
ground that the rules exceeded the authority delegated to the FCC by Congress. FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708 (1979). See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying
text. The Court did not reach the First Amendment implications of a right of citizen access,
but implied that such access would not exceed Congress' authority under the Constitution.
Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 708. In 1984, Congress passed legislation which grants state and
local regulators discretion to mandate the creation of public access channels. Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws
(98 Stat.) 2779. The constitutionality of cable access is now ripe for adjudication.
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sense of the process by which television might best foster these two
goals. Misunderstanding of the real impact of television resulted in the
Court's approval of the Fairness Doctrine. This regulatory system as-
signs the broadcast media the impossible task of presenting "truth" to
the public, while simultaneously denying the public the opportunity to
challenge and debate that truth in the same forum.
The Article then seeks to set forth fundamental First Amendment
values by analyzing the work of four theorists: John Stuart Mill, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Alexander Meiklejohn and Thomas Emerson. Mill
believed that truth was an absolute value, discernible by human beings
only through direct human communication.I'
Holmes rejected Mill's notion of absolute truth in favor of a truth
measured as subjective or relative knowledge. Yet Holmes agreed with
Mill that the process of generating knowledge is not successfully ac-
complished without the direct interaction of individuals. Through
communication, individuals develop critical thinking, especially self-
criticism, which is necessary if society is to govern itself by the power of
reason rather than coercion.
12
Rejecting the search for truth as a First Amendment goal,
Meiklejohn anchored his system of freedom of expression to the con-
cept of democratic participation. Meiklejohn believed that the basic
goal of the First Amendment was to insure that persons who possessed
truth could educate the voters on issues requiring collective decision-
making. Meiklejohn apparently assumed that voters naturally possess
critical reason, and that once educated in political truth, they would
naturally comprehend its significance and act accordingly. Partisan
politics would be abandoned for the collective good.'
3
Recognizing that this division of First Amendment goals created a
potential crisis, Emerson combined the theories of Mills, Holmes and
Meiklejohn into a comprehensive First Amendment system. Unlike his
predecessors, Emerson did not place societal needs before the needs of
the individual. Instead, he established self-fulfillment as the most fun-
damental First Amendment goal.
14
11. See infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
14. Self-fulfillment was defined as the communication of thought, the fountainhead of
all expression of the individual personality. Through self-expression, the individual would
be prepared to search for knowledge, or truth. Possessed of knowledge, the individual
would be able to participate fully in the democratic process. Finally, by providing individu-
als with the right to express themselves, to discover truth, and to participate in collective
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Accepting Emerson's system as the most complete expression of
our fundamental First Amendment values, the Article attempts to
demonstrate mechanisms by which those values might be achieved.
Using the philosophical work of George Mead and Karl Mannheim,
the Article outlines the process of social communication by which the
individual develops a sense of self and explains why that process is
inseparable from the search for truth as described by Mill and Holmes.
The Article demonstrates that social communication is a continuous
process which depends on the participation of both speakers and listen-
ers for its effectiveness. Drawing on four decades of research by com-
munications scientists and social psychologists, the Article
demonstrates why television technology distorts social communication,
preventing individuals from active participation and causing them to
develop a distorted sense of themselves and of *ociety. It is suggested
that the influence of television is responsible for a pacification of the
electorate and that the current system of media regulation, especially
the Fairness Doctrine, is an ineffective remedy for the problem.
The Article concludes that active social communication must be
strengthened if individuals are to achieve greater knowledge and more
effective participation in democratic decisionmaking. As the nation's
dominant form of social communication, television must cease to pro-
vide access only to the privileged few. Only an active public will lead
to a more responsive and stable system of government. To this end, a
regulatory scheme is presented which would allow viable public access
to cable television, replacing the archaic, ineffective, and intrusive rules
now regulating cable television.
I. The Regulatory Scheme
A. Federal and State Jurisdiction
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates the
broadcast media in the public interest pursuant to authority granted by
Congress in the Communications Act of 1934.15
The main justification for government regulation of the broadcast
decisionmaking, society would be able to achieve stability through the use of reason, rather
than coercion. See infra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 152 (1975 & Supp. 1982). Under § 152(a), the FCC is granted specific
authority to regulate "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio .... "
Such communication is defined by the Act "so as to encompass 'the transmission of...
signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds,' whether by radio or cable, 'including all instru-
mentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things the receipt, forwarding,
and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission."' Id at § 153(a)-(b).
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media stems from the doctrine of spectrum scarcity.' 6 The doctrine as-
sumes that the over-the-air broadcast spectrum is part of the public
domain protected by the federal government. The spectrum consists of
a limited number of frequencies that permit only a small number of
citizens to use the spectrum without interfering with other broadcasts.
To prevent chaos on the airwaves, Congress settled on a system that
grants an exclusive license to a single broadcaster for the use of a par-
ticular frequency. 7
Under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,18 Congress
extended the FCC full jurisdiction over the regulation of cable televi-
sion. However, under the Cable Act, Congress placed the issue of pub-
lic access within the discretion of state and local governments now
engaged in franchising cable systems.' 9 Typically, a cable operator
must obtain a state franchise to use public streets, telephone poles and
underground ducts to string its cables.2 0
16. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1942).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1983).
18. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779. Before the passage of this Act, the FCC's assertion of
jurisdiction over cable television (CATV) had been upheld by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968). The Court did not
classify CATV systems as common carriers under Title II of the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-24 (1982) or as broadcasters under Title III of the Act, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 301-99b (1982). Yet the Court found nothing in the Act's language or in its history that
limited the FCC's authority to the specific provisions of the Act. Rather, the Court found
that underlying the Communications Act was congressional recognition of the rapid and
continuous evolution of broadcasting and a corresponding need for flexibility in its regula-
tion. Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress had given the FCC a "'comprehensive
mandate' with 'not niggardly but expansive powers."' Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 172
(quoting National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 219).
The Court held that the FCC's jurisdiction extended "to that Uurisdiction] reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting" in the public interest. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at
178. The Court further held that the FCC, in exercising its ancillary jurisdiction over cable
television, could "issue 'such rules and regulations . . . as public convenience, interest or
necessity requires.'" Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 178 (quoting 47 U.S.C. 303(r) (1964)).
19. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779. The FCC has declined to engage in licensing cable at
the federal level because of the administrative difficulties such a scheme would entail. Cable
Television Channel Capacity and Channel Access Requirements of Section 76.251, Report
and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
20. FCC Information Bulletin, Mar. 1982, at 8. A franchise is a grant of authority to
use the public right-of-way (streets, telephone poles, underground ducts). A state may re-
quire a private corporation to obtain such a franchise if the conduct of the corporation's
business causes disruption of the public right of way. Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1981). See F. WELCH, PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION 76-78 (1968), for a discussion of state and federal franchise requirements. See
Cable television is generally recognized as a natural monopoly
that makes competition among cable operators inefficient and poten-
tially destructive of all but one company.21 To avoid the unnecsessary
burden on public facilities which competition would produce, most
states usually do not grant more than one franchise for a given geo-
graphic area.22
also NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON CABLE TELEVISION, CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISING
WORKBOOK, chs. 4, 5 (1980).
21. The essential feature of a natural monopoly is an inherent tendency for company
costs per service unit to decrease (and company returns to increase) as use of the proferred
goods or services increases. This market efficiency occurs only when all market resources
are concentrated in one company. Therefore, the natural movement of the market will be
toward concentration of resources and away from competition. 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 113-26 (1971); see also W. SHEPERD &
C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 45-53, 249-51 (1979).
In cable television, these economies of scale make it inefficient to construct and operate
more than one cable system in a particular region. The cables must be strung whether the
company sells its service to one customer or many. Once the system is in operation, the
company can add new customers at little cost simply by hooking them up to the existing
lines. Thus, the cost of providing cable service will actually decrease as each new unit is sold.
Competition in such an industry will likely lead to economic waste and the collapse of all
but one of the companies. The cable industry argues that its service is not a natural monop-
oly because of alternative media sources such as broadcast television, direct satellite broad-
casting, videodisks and telephone data lines. However, "[wlhatever alternative means of
communication exist, nothing else can offer the equivalent of the multiservice broadband
cable running past every house. One can imagine a railroad owner denying being a monopo-
list because any one refused access to a train could use a horse and buggy." I. DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 173 (1983). A concise and readable treatment of cable
television's natural monopoly characteristics is found in Comment, Hit or Myth" The Cable
TVMarkeplace, Diversity and Regulation, 35 FED. COM. L.J. 41, 61-66 (1983).
Recent studies indicate that typically 40-55% of the homes that have access to a cable
system actually subscribe. This penetration rate is only about 10% more than the minimum
necessary to sustain a single cable company's operation. See Inquiry into the Economic
Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, Report and Order, 79
F.C.C.2d 663, 686 (1980) on penetration rates and demand for cable service. See also NA-
TIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, CABLE COMMUNICATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10-11
(1981).
Even if the economics of cable television did not deter competition, the limits of present
technology would. Existing utility poles are unsuited to competitive wiring because they
have space for only one system's cable. The standard 35 foot utility pole has 17 feet of
usable space, sufficient to meet technical and safety requirements for three cables (one tele-
phone, one electric and one television). Attachment of a fourth cable would cause consider-
able logistical problems. See Pole Attachments, 72 F.C.C.2d 71 (1979).
Use of underground ducts has been found equally impractical because of the inconven-
ience to the public of tearing up the streets to add new lines and remove old ones. See CtP
of Boulder, supra note 20, at 1377-78.
22. Eleven states regulate cable television as a public utility and, as with other natural
monopolies, require cable systems to adhere to state operating standards. FCC Cable Tele-
vision Information Bulletin, Mar. 1982, at 8. At least thirty states permit municipalities to
regulate cable systems, subject to state statutory guidelines. Id The Supreme Court has
sanctioned state franchising and regulation of cable systems absent federal preemption. In
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B. Broadcast Access
Broadcast and cable television are audio-video media that have a
nearly identical impact on the perceptions of the viewing public. There-
fore, the regulations governing broadcast access are relevant when con-
sidering cable access requirements.
Although broadcasters are given substantial discretion to deter-
mine what ideas will be conveyed over the airwaves, the federal gov-
emnment is permitted to take measures to assure that issues of public
importance are reported. Under the FCC's Fairness Doctrine, broad-
casters must give adequate coverage to public issues and must report
those issues in a manner that accurately reflects conflicting views.'
This must be done at the broadcaster's own expense if sponsorship is
not available.24
The FCC also promotes a diversity of views by compelling the
broadcast media to grant certain citizens access to the airwaves. The
law distinguishes two types of access requirements. Contingent access
is the right to respond to a transmission by the broadcaster. Aflirma-
tive access is the right to use broadcast facilities for one's own
25expression.
Contingent access rules require that when a broadcaster levies a
personal attack on an individual or endorses a political candidate, the
party adversely affected must be given a reasonable opportunity to re-
spond.26 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,2 7 the Supreme Court
upheld the FCC's personal attack and editorial reply rules and implied
TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (1968), arf'dmem., 396 U.S. 556 (1970), the Court
affirmed a federal district court decision upholding Nevada's cable regulation scheme as a
valid assertion of that state's power to regulate public utilities. The district court had found
that while a cable system is engaged in interstate commerce, it constitutes "only the last stage
of the transmission of television signals." 304 F. Supp. at 463. Because "the apparatus of
the system has incidents much more local than national, involving cable equipment through
public streets and ways, local franchises, local intrastate advertising and selling of services
and local intrastate collections," it does not constitute a burden on interstate commerce. Id
The Tenth Amendment provides that: "The powers not delegated to the United States
.. . are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The
power to regulate property affected with a public interest is reserved to the states as part of
its power to promote the public good. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 125 (1877). One of the most
common justifications for regulating an industry as a public utility is the existence of a natu-
ral monopoly.
23. 47 C.F.R. § 73 (1983).
24. Id.; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377-79 (1969).
25. Professor Benno Schmidt first introduced the terms "contingent" and "affirmative"
to distinguish between the existing methods of providing access to the media. B. SCHmIDT,
JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC AccEss 17 (1976).
26. 47 C.F.R. § 73 (1920).
27. 395 U.S. 367 (1968).
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that the entire Fairness Doctrine constituted a valid exercise of con-
gressionally delegated authority. The Court held that a broadcast i-
censee has no constitutional right to hold the license or monopolize the
broadcast frequency to the exclusion of others.2 8 Rather, broadcast
licensees should conduct themselves as "a proxy or fiduciary with obli-
gations to present those views and voices which are representative of
[the] community."29
The Supreme Court has permitted affirmative access to the broad-
cast media only to candidates for federal elective office.3" As part of
the increased political broadcasting responsibility imposed on broad-
casters by Congress in the 1970's, the Court held in Columbia Broad-
casting System v. FCC3 that broadcasters must permit electoral
candidates to purchase airtime.32 The Court stipulated, however, that
Congress did not intend to extend a general right of access to citizens
other than those seeking elective office.33
In addressing the First Amendment implications of political access
provisions, the Court stated that "speech concerning public affairs is
. . . the essence of self-government."34 Therefore, the First Amend-
ment "has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the con-
duct of campaigns for political office."' 35 By permitting candidates to
purchase time on a broadcaster's frequency, the Court hoped to create
the possibility that "the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candi-
dates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before
choosing them on election day."3 6
Less than a decade earlier, the Supreme Court had struck down
the Democratic National Committee's attempt to buy broadcast time
against the wishes of CBS management.37 The Court held that Con-
gress, in enacting section 3(h) of the Communications Act, did not in-
tend broadcasters to be common carriers; rather, broadcasters were
28. Id. at 389.
29. Id.
.30. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
31. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
32. Id. at 396. The Court held that CBS had violated 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7), which
provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he Commission may revoke any station license or con-
struction permit-. . . (7) for willfull or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or
permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a
legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." Id.




37. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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provided with discretion to determine the content of their programs,
subject only to the public interest standard of the Fairness Doctrine.3"
Furthermore, while broadcasters were held responsible for presenting
opposing viewpoints on public issues, no mechanism for insuring bal-
anced presentations by private access seekers existed.39 Even if equal
time provisions were instituted for editorial advertisements, those pri-
vate citizens who could most afford access would determine the issues
discussed."a Because private access seekers could not be held accounta-
ble under the Fairness Doctrine, the Court feared that a right of access
would necessarily involve the government in day-to-day oversight of
broadcast operations, "deciding. . .whether a particular individual or
group has had sufficient opportunity to present its viewpoint and
whether a particular viewpoint has already been sufficiently aired."41
The Court was careful not to foreclose the possibility that at some
future date Congress or the Commission---or the broadcasters-may
devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and
desirable."42
C. Cable Access
By 1970, the FCC had extended the Fairness Doctrine to all cable-
casting (programming originated by the cable operator).43 Two years
later, the FCC imposed mandatory access rules under which cable sys-
tems in the 100 largest markets were required to increase their channel
capacity to twenty channels. Three of those channels were reserved for
free use by public educational and governmental groups and a fourth
channel was reserved for leased access.' By 1976, the access require-
ments were extended beyond the top 100 markets to include all cable
38. Id. at 121-25. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982) provides that "a person engaged [in] radio
broadcasting shall not ... be deemed a common carrier." The Supreme Court has defined
a common carrier in the communications context as one that "makes a public offering to
provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of the public who choose to em-
ploy such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and choos-
ing .. " FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979) (quoting Amendment of
Parts 2, 91, and 99 of the Commission's Rules Insofar as They Relate to the Industrial Radi-
olocation Service, Report and Order, 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966)).
39. 412 U.S. at 123.
40. Id
41. Id. at 127.
42. Id. at 131.
43. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1983).
44. Cable Television, Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 240-41 (1972) Access to re-
served channels was on a first come-first serve basis, and the cable operators had no control
over the content of the programming shown on the access channels. Id
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systems with more than 3500 subscribers.45
In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,46 the Supreme Court struck down
the access requirements as exceeding the FCC's jurisdiction to effectu-
ate rules for cable television "reasonably ancillary" to the Commis-
sion's regulation of broadcast television. The Court found that the
access rules "transferred control of the content of cable access channels
from cable operators to members of the public who wish to communi-
cate by the cable medium. '47 The rules, in effect, forced common car-
rier status on the operators. 8 The Court reasoned that because
Congress had not granted the FCC authority to force common carrier
status on broadcast television, over which the Commission had full ju-
risdiction, the Commission could not possibly relegate cable operators
to such status based on lesser jurisdiction. 9
The Court stated that the power to compel cable operators to pro-
vide common-carriage services to the public must come from Congress,
presumably under its power to regulate interstate commerce5 ° The
Court declined to rule on the First Amendment implications of a feder-
ally imposed right of access to cable television, but in dicta stated that
Congress possessed constitutional authority to require such access.'
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act,
which requires cable operators to provide leased access to their systems
and grants the FCC authority to regulate such access.52 Furthermore,
45. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the
Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section 76.251,
Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 303-06 (1976). The four access channels would only be
required of systems having sufficient demand for such access. Otherwise, the operaters were
free to combine local access programming on one or more nonaccess channels. 59 F.C.C.2d
at 314-16.
46. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
47. Id. at 700.
48. The Court was careful to note that cable systems may operate as common carriers
with respect to some parts of their service, although not the program transmissions function.
Id. at 701 n.9.
49. The Court stated that: "In determining. . . whether the Commission's assertion of
jurisdiction is 'reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [its] various responsibili-
ties for the regulation of television broadcasting,' United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, at 176,. . . we are unable to ignore Congress' stem disapproval- evidenced
in § 3(h)-of negation of the editorial discretion otherwise enjoyed by broadcasters and
cable operators alike." 440 U.S. at 708.
50. 440 U.S. at 708.
51. Id at 709.
52. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2779. In 1984 there were approximately 1,000 cable access
centers operating nationally. A cable center may operate between one and twelve local ac-
cess channels, depending on citizen demand. Telephone interview with Randy Van Dalsen,
National Federation of Local Cable Programmers, Washington, D.C. (July 13, 1984).
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state and local franchising authorities may require cable operators to
set aside free public access channels. 3 Many franchising authorities
already compel cable franchise holders to provide such affirmative ac-
cess. However, the National Cable Television Association (NCTA)
maintains that governmentally imposed free access to cable systems is
violative of cable operators' First Amendment rights. a
Because the government cannot condition receipt of a license or
franchise on acceptance of terms that violate the applicant's constitu-
tional rights,55 the issue of whether access requirements violate cable
operators' First Amendment rights is of immediate concern to the
public.
II. First Amendment Theory
A. John Stuart Mill
The predominant theory of First Amendment interpretation is the
doctrine of the marketplace of ideas. 6 While the marketplace doctrine
is subject to several different formulations, its unifying principle holds
that "truth," or at least society's closest approximation of truth, arises
from a governmental system that permits robust public debate. 7 This
principle is founded on the beliefs that (1) truth may be isolated,
(2) truth is grasped through the use of reason, (3) human beings possess
reason, and (4) an unimpeded flow of information is necessary if the
human power of reason is to be effective in attaining truth.58 The ques-
tions of what is meant by truth and what uses are to be made of truth
have perplexed and divided both proponents and opponents of the
marketplace doctrine for most of the twentieth century.
53. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2779.
54. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Cable Television Ass'n, supra note 8, at 13-18.
55. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981) ("a person may be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment
right and participation in an otherwise available public program"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 387, 404 (1963) ("liberties of religion and expression may [not] be infringed by the
denial or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege").
56. The marketplace of ideas doctrine has been preeminent for at least four decades.
See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247 (1974); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 183 (1973); Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944).
57. Baker, Scope ofthe First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 964
(1978).
58. Id. at 967; see also Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438,
444 (1983).
CIRCUMSTANCES WITHIN OUR CONTROL
John Stuart Mill, one of the earliest and most well known market-
place theorists, conceived of truth as an objective Platonic form existing
apart from the subjective prejudice of the unenlightened person.
59
Although he was writing in 1858, at the dawn of the biological and
scientific revolution, Mill's philosophy was rooted in an eighteenth cen-
tury faith in natural law. "In the eighteenth century," Professor Carl
Becker informs us, "nature was regarded as a delicately adjusted
machine, a stationary engine whose mechanism implied the existence
of a purposeful engineer, a beneficent first cause or Author of the Uni-
verse." 60 For Mill, the correctness of arguments could still be mea-
sured against this universal standard.6' Rational debate was the tool
for peeling away the layers of subjective opinion to reveal the objective
truth.62
In his essay On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion,63 Mill pro-
vides three arguments for a system that permits speech to be heard:
(1) an opinion that is silenced may contain the truth, and society is
denied its benefit; (2) neither majority nor minority opinions are usu-
ally the whole truth; only the collision of adverse opinions in open dis-
cussion can supply the remainder of the truth; (3) even if an opinion is
wholly true, it must be vigorously contested or the recipients of the
opinion will have little comprehension of its rationality.64
Modem critics of Mill's defense of free speech have focused on its
archaic faith in the existence of objective truth;65 however, these critics
have ignored the still vital argument that the interaction of people is
59. The purpose of free speech, according to Mill, is to "give the truth a chance of
reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be
found when the human mind is capable of receiving it." J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in COL-
LECTED WORKS 232 (1977). The Supreme Court, in defining the purpose of the marketplace
of ideas theory, is fond of quoting Mill. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 189 n.25 (1973) (Brennan & Marshall, J.J., dissenting); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 n.18 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 272 n.13, 279 n.19 (1964); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514-15 (1961).
60. C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS
161 (1977).
61. "[N]o belief which is contrary to truth can really be useful." J.S. MILL, supra note
59, at 234.
62. Mill believed that "[t]he steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion
by collating it with that of others. . . is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it."
Id at 232.
63. This essay is contained in J.S. MILL, supra note 59, at 228.
64. Id at 258.
65. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 57, at 974-76. Baker claims that modem society, unwill-
ing to acknowledge absolute truth, believes that truth is dependent on people's "interests,
needs, and experiences which lead them to slice and categorize an expanding mass of sense
data." Id at 974.
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necessary for ideas to be generated. Although Mill believed that
"truth" exists apart from human beings, he clearly understood that
human knowledge of the world is inseparable from the dynamic pro-
cess by which that knowledge is learned.
66
Mill was convinced that truth, once discovered, could not be suc-
cessfully transmitted to the citizen by an elite class of teachers, because
the teachers' interpretations cannot "do justice to the arguments or
bring them into real contact with [the citizen's] own mind."67 Rather,
the citizen must be able to hear and participate in vigorous debate with
persons "who actually believe in [opposing arguments]. . . ; who de-
fend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them."68 Without
such direct communication, "the meaning of the doctrine itself will be
in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on
the character and conduct; the dogma becoming a mere formal profes-
sion, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, preventing the
growth of any real heartfelt conviction, free from reason or personal
experience.
'69
B. Oliver Wendell Holmes
The importance of individual participation in the search for truth
was not lost on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who introduced a ver-
sion of Mill's marketplace of ideas doctrine to judicial decisionmaking
with his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States.7" Holmes' version
of the marketplace doctrine has been generally interpreted by the
courts as consistent with that of Mill. However, the two theorists dif-
fered in one important respect: Mill believed that public debate would
reveal absolute truth, while Holmes was convinced that at best only
imperfect knowledge would result. The distinction is largely historical.
In the sixty years since Mill had written his defense of liberty,
much of American philosophy had abandoned its faith in absolute
truth in favor of the relativism of modem science and William James'
pragmatism.7' The pragmatist measured the truth of an idea by deter-
mining whether the idea's being true would make a concrete difference
to an individual's life. "True ideas," James wrote, "are those that we
66. Mill believed that in the search for truth, the human being "is capable of rectifying
his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone, there must be discus-
sion, to show how experience is to be interpreted." J.S. MILL, supra note 59, at 23 1.
67. Id. at 245.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 258.
70. 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. H.S. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 91-107 (1950).
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can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those
that we can not."72 For Holmes, truth was that which he could not help
but believe; it was "the system of [his] own limitations. '7 3 Proceeding
from this relativist stance, Holmes devoted himself to the overthrow of
the absolutism of the natural law.74 In his legal opinions, Holmes
promulgated a philosophy of law that accounted for the mutability of
human beliefs, a system that Holmes hoped would be verifiable
through human experience and as malleable as the people who would
implement it.
75
Holmes' freedom of speech doctrine assumes that human beings
are destined to live in society,76 and that the will of the majority will
prevail.77 Holmes believed that human action is guided by ideas and
that speech is the vehicle for the expression of ideas.78 Therefore, soci-
etal or majoritarian action is guided by the quality of speech that
reaches the people.
Holmes urged that imperfect knowledge of the world limits the
72. Id at 95.
73. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), reprinted in
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine.- Some Frag-
ments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 757 (1975). That Holmes was committed to philo-
sophical relativism is evident in the letter: "When I say a thing is true I mean that I can't
help believing it-and nothing more. But as I observe that the Cosmos is not always limited
by my Cant Helps I don't bother about absolute truth or even inquire whether there is such a
thing, but define the Truth as the system of my own limitations." Id
74. Holmes wrote: "In regard to the law, it is true, no doubt, that an evolutionist will
hesitate to affirm a universal validity for his social ideals, or for the principles which he
thinks should be embodied in legislation. He is content if he can prove them best for here
and now. He may be ready to admit that he knows nothing about an absolute best in the
cosmos, and even that he knows next to nothing about a permanent best for men." O.W.
HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, at 185-86 (1920).
75. Despite his skepticism of absolutes, Holmes believed that "a body of law is more
rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely
to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for that end are stated or are ready to be
stated in words." Id. at 186.
76. Holmes explained in a letter to Judge Hand that: "[S]ociety has not perished, be-
cause man is a social animal, and with every turn falls into a new pattern like the Kaleido-
scope." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand, supra note 73.
77. In his dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Holmes argued that truth
in a democratic society is majoritarian, but that even the ideas of a minority (in that case a
Communist minority) must be given an opportunity to win the acceptance of a majority.
Holmes stated that: "Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is
acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement
at its birth. . . . [I]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance ... " Id. at 673.
78. See supra note 77.
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validity of all ideas.7 9 Yet the human power of reason permits individ-
uals to make critical judgments about the relative merit of their ideas.
Holmes wrote: "For the most part men believe what they want to ....
But reason means truth and those who are not governed by it take the
chance that some day the sunken fact will rip the bottom out of their
boat."8 He believed that critical thinking, especially self-criticism, fos-
ters tolerance of the beliefs of others"1 and benefits society by facilitat-
ing the choice of more reasoned-if not perfect-courses of action."
While Holmes rejected Mill's faith in absolutes, he adopted the
latter's conviction that ideas are grasped most effectively through vigor-
ous debate. Thus, in formulating his marketplace of ideas doctrine,
Holmes defined "truth" as the process of discourse itself: "The best test
of truth is the power of truth to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth [the power of thought in the marketplace] is
the only ground upon which their [the people's] wishes safely can be
carried out."83
C. Alexander Meiklejohn
The citizen's role in public discourse was dealt a serious philo-
sophical blow by Alexander Meiklejohn, whose writings during the
1940's and 1950's influenced a generation of lawyers and jurists. Es-
pousing intellectual freedom in the face of the intolerance of Mc-
Carthyism, Meiklejohn found Holmesian self-doubt a poor foundation
for a system of freedom of speech. Meiklejohn believed that absolute
truth might be discerned, and chastized Holmes' relativism for bringing
"intellectual degradation . . . upon the minds of our people."'
Meiklejohn denounced relativism because, in his opinion, it lacked
standards for differentiating between truth and falsity and it permitted
defining truth as "what a man or a nation can get away with."8" He
79. Holmes expressed this belief in his famous dissent in Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624: "[the
Constitution] is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge." See
also HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 255-56 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
80. Holmes, Introduction to Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, in I 1 MODERN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY SERIES, xxix, xxxi (1923).
81. Professor Lee Bollinger has pointed out that Holmes fully agreed with a letter from
Judge Hand in which the latter declared that "Tolerance is the Twin of Incredulity." See
Bollinger, supra note 58, at 463.
82. See supra note 75.
83. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624.
84. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 74 (1960).
85. Id.
held Holmes' intellectual individualism responsible, "more than any
single factor," for undermining the meaning of the term "devotion to
the general welfare."
86
Meiklejohn believed that objective truth formed the only proper
basis for social action s7 and that citizens worthy of self-government
would exercise their franchise beyond their own self-interest, voting ob-
jectively for the common good. 8 Thus, for Meiklejohn, the discovery
of new truth was not the primary purpose of First Amendment free-
dom. 9 Instead, he viewed the Constitution's speech clause as "the de-
vice for sharing whatever truth has been won,"9 enabling the citizenry
to fully understand the proper course of action.
In linking freedom of speech to the process of self-government,
Meildejohn argued that "public" speech-speech regarding issues of
public importance-is entitled to greater protection than "private"
speech that concerns individual issues.9 1
The generation of new knowledge did not concern Meikldejobn.
Unlike Mill and Holmes, he minimized the importance of discourse
and thus diminished the role of the individual citizen as an active par-
ticipant in the communication process.9 2 Instead, Meiklejobn empha-
sized the instructional aspects of communication, envisioning the
people as passive receivers of truth. "[T]he point of ultimate interest,"
Meiklejohn wrote, "is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of
the hearers. . . . The voters . . . must be made as wise as possible." 93
86. Id.
87. Meiklejohn concurred with Holmes that "[w]e need truth as a basis for our actions,"
but was convinced that such truth should be used for societal, rather than simply individual,
action. Id at 74-75.
88. 1d at 73-75. On this point see Bollinger, supra note 58, at 459.
89. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 84, at 74-75.
90. Id at 75.
91. Id at 37-39. Meiklejohn limited his original definition of public speech to clearly
political expression, and this definition later influenced the Supreme Court. See infra notes
94-102 and accompanying text. Near the end of his life, however, Meiklejohn expanded his
definition of public speech to include science and the arts, from which the voters "derive
knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values; the capacity for sane and objective
judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express." Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 256.
92. Meiklejohn would not tolerate individuals being barred from speaking on the
grounds that the ideas presented were false or dangerous. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 84, at
27. However, "[t]he First Amendment is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness. It
does not require that. . . every citizen shall take part in debate. . . .Nor can it even give
assurance that everyone shall have opportunity to do so." Id at 26.
93. Id.
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D. Mill, Holmes, Meiklejohn, and the Mass Media
The theories of Mill and Holmes, formulated before the emer-
gence of telecommunications, assumed that channels of expression
were freely available to all citizens.94 The cost of printing then, as now,
was not a barrier to individual expression. Television, however, greatly
increases the persuasive power of a message by presenting moving, life-
like images,9 5 and facilitates the dissemination of that message to much
larger audiences than may be reached by printed material.
The Supreme Court recognized the power of the electronic media
in general and television in particular when it sanctioned use of the
Fairness Doctrine to regulate broadcasting. Whereas Mill and Holmes
had conceived of the marketplace of ideas as operating without govern-
ment interference, the court-applying Meiklejohn's theory of public
stewardship--gave government an affirmative role to correct market
failures.96 Moreover, the professional broadcast media, undifferenti-
ated by Mill and Holmes, now receive legal treatment distinct from
that received by individual citizens.97
The broadcast media, designated as the primary vehicle for the
presentation of public issues, are charged under the Fairness Doctrine
with presenting opposing viewpoints in such a way that objective
"truth" may be discerned by the audience.9" To establish credibility,
journalists must emphasize their "objectivity" in distinguishing "fact"
from "opinion." Strict adherence to this distinction is the hallmark of
good journalism.9 9 Fulfilling Meiklejohn's vision of the dissemination
94. For example, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Holmes saw a direct
relationship between an idea and action. Failure of an idea to elicit action might occur only
if the idea is outweighed by another, or "some failure of energy stifles the movement at its
birth." Id. at 673. See supra note 77. The day had not yet arrived when a good and strong
idea would die because it was denied access to the nation's primary medium of expression.
See infra notes 239-44 and 264-66 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 171-96 and accompanying text.
96. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122
(1973). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
97. In Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), citizen access for the purpose of artic-
ulating ideas was not permitted. The core of the Court's reasoning was derived from
Meiklejobn: "What is essential, is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth
saying shall be said." 412 U.S. at 122 (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 84 at 26). Acting
under the supervision of the government, only the professional media are to provide society
with the information and ideas necessary for the function of democracy. See supra notes 37-
41 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
99. Justice Sides With FCC on Telco Cable, BROADCASTING, Apr. 13, 1981, at 114; see
also Lee, The Problems of 'Reasonable Access" to Broadcastingfor Non- Commercial Expres-
sion: Content Discrimination, Appellate Review, and Separation of Commercial and Non-Com-
mercial Expression, 351 U. FLA. L. REV. 348, 352 (1982).
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of knowledge, objective reporters unveil the layers of subjectivity that
hide "truth." Broadcasters who fail to report the world "objectively"
face loss of their license to operate. 1°° The private and presumptively
subjective speech of access seekers would upset this system by introduc-
ing an agenda of issues not "publicly important," presented in a biased
or "untruthful" way.' 0 '
The theories of Mill, Holmes and Meiklejohn define the right of
individual expression as different from, and subservient to, the needs of
society as a whole. Yet the success of each theory depends upon the
individual's ability to grasp and retain ideas. For Mill and Holmes,
truth, whether absolute or relative, was only effective in guiding socie-
tal decisions if individuals could understand its significance. Both men
recognized that ideas are generated and received through dynamic
communication and discourse. For Meiklejohn, it was unnecessary
that people discuss social issues, since the people would presumably be
capable of receiving the truth once it was disseminated by the desig-
nated elites. While the Supreme Court has not endorsed the position
that individual participation is unnecessary, it has deferred to Con-




Professor Thomas I. Emerson has been the most influential mod-
em scholar to call for a return of the individual to primacy under the
First Amendment freedom of expression.103 Emerson rejects the notion
that free speech is tolerated solely so that society may obtain knowl-
100. See Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 121. In considering licensee applications
and reapplications and in responding to complaints, the FCC has addressed the issue of
broadcast news practices 51 times over a period of 32 years. In each case the Commission
reviewed the news content of the broadcaster whose license was in question. Albert, The
Federal Regulation of Radio and Television Newscasts, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 309, 330-31
(1982).
101. See supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 253-58 (1974);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-31 (1973); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969).
103. First Amendment theorists C. Edwin Baker and Marvin H. Redish share Professor
Emerson's belief that a primary goal of the First Amendment is individual fulfillment. See
generally Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S.
CAL. L. REv. 293 (1982); Baker, Realizing Self-Reah'zation: Corporate Political Expenditures
and Redish'r The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. Rv. 646 (1982); Baker, Scope ofthe
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, supra note 57; Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy,
and Freedom of Expression, 130 U. PA. L. Rav. 678 (1982); Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. Rav. 591 (1982).
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edge. Rather, he posits that societal goals may properly be attained
only if individual needs are satisfied. Accordingly, Emerson assigns the
First Amendment four essential values: (1) individual self-fulfillment;
(2) advancement of individual knowledge and the discovery of truth;
(3) participation in decisionmaking by all members of society;
(4) achievement of a more adaptable and more stable community."°
For Emerson, the primary goal of the First Amendment is to per-
mit the individual to realize his or her character and potential as a
human being.10 5 Speech is the basis for achieving this self-realiza-
tion. 06 "Thought and communication are the fountainhead of all ex-
pression of the individual personality. To cut off the flow at the source
is to dry up the whole stream. Freedom at this point is essential to all
other freedoms."10 7 Emerson's other three First Amendment values de-
rive from and depend on the individual's ability to develop his or her
faculties. 108
Having established the centrality of individual development to
First Amendment doctrine, Emerson is free to merge important ele-
ments of the theories of Mill, Meiklejohn and Holmes into a compre-
hensive system. 10 9 From Mill and Holmes, Emerson derives the
concept that individual and societal knowledge of the world ("truth") is
accomplished only through a dynamic communication process, in
which the individual actively tests his or her ideas against those of
others. 10 Next, Emerson argues that freedom of expression is particu-
larly important to a democratic society since, as Meiklejohn stated, vot-
ers must be fully informed and capable of analyzing critically the issues
104. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 6-7 (1970).
105. Emerson argues that "[t]he proper end of man is the realization of his character and
potentialities as a human being. For the achievement of this self-realization, the mind must
be free. Hence suppression of belief, opinion, or other expression is an affront to the dignity
of man, a negation of man's essential nature." Id at 6.
106. See supra note 105.
107. T. EMERSON, supra note 104, at 9.
108. Emerson holds that "lain effective system of freedom of expression depends upon
an abundance of raw materials. . . in the form of information, ideas, and alternative solu-
tions, and upon the development of skills for utilizing those raw materials, in the form of
ability to understand, appraise, and create." Id. at 671.
109. Emerson does not make explicit reference to Mill, Meildejohn and Holmes, but
their influence is evident in the latter three goals which he promulgates for the First Amend-
ment. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
110. According to Emerson, "[ain individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear
all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposi-
tion, and make full use of different minds." T. EMERSON, supra note 104, at 6.
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upon which they pass judgment."I ' Finally, like Holmes, Emerson ar-
gues that society is dynamic, not static, and that its growth is fostered
by open and reasoned public discourse."t 2 Suppression of ideas retards
society's growth by promoting inflexibility and preventing society from
identifying and responding to changing conditions."13 Moreover, socie-
tal stability and cohesion are maintained by reason rather than by
coercion. 114
Each of the three borrowed values-acquisition of knowledge,
self-governance, and societal stability-contribute to the fulfillment of
the individual. Yet they lose all meaning if individuals cannot discover
their humanity through self-expression. Writing a purely legal theory,
Emerson does not define self-expression in either philosophical or psy-
chological terms. To describe the impact of television on individual
freedom of expression, however, it will be necessary to explain in detail
the development and expression of the self through social
communication.
III. Fulfillment of First Amendment Values
A. Self-Realization
A half century ago, psychologists and philosophers generalized
about the universal character of the mind, positing that the power of
reason grows naturally from birth to adulthood. 1' 5 Since that time,
however, this developmental universalism has been tempered by the
discovery that an individual's environment plays a crucial role in the
growth of the mind." 6 While genetic factors provide each individual
with certain capabilities, mental activity varies according to cultural
demands, beliefs and linguistic structure."t
7
111. Emerson states that "[o]nce one accepts the premise of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence-that governments 'derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,'-it
follows that the governed must, in order to exercise the right of consent, have full freedom of




114. Emerson writes: "The process of open discussion promotes greater cohesion in a
society because people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they have a
part in the decision-making process. . . . Freedom of expression thus provides a frame-
work in which conflict necessary to the progress of society can take place without destroying
the society." Id
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The emergence of the self takes place in stages.' i8 Perception, the
most basic element of consciousness, begins at birth with an infant's
awareness of the nearness of objects."l 9 With the acquisition of lan-
guage, the individual learns deixs, the linguistic term for "a knowledge
of who is speaking to whom and where they are located in time and
space."120 Over time, individuals then learn to orient themselves as ob-
jects in reference to other objects and events in the universe. At this
stage, the individual's self "is constituted simply by an organization of
the particular attitudes of other individuals toward [him]self and to-
ward one another in the specific social acts in which he participates."' 21
The individual need not actively organize the attitudes of others to
achieve this consciousness. All genetically unimpaired individuals pre-
sumably attain this level.'
22
Yet, if individuals are to develop in the fullest sense and achieve
the self-realization that epitomizes Professor Emerson's First Amend-
ment, it is not sufficient that they passively accept their social condi-
tioning. Rather, self-realization is possible only if the individual
actively attempts to attain an awareness of his or her relation to the
social process.
Self-realization is an attempt to transcend the relativism that Jus-
tice Holmes believed limited human knowledge. For Holmes, all
knowledge was subjective; the self, as a product of social forces, cannot
look beyond its own conditioning to discover objective truth. The later
pragmatists, especially George H. Mead, a student of William James,
eventually became dissatisfied with relativism. The pragmatists be-
lieved that the mind could achieve more than purely subjective knowl-
edge by transcending its social conditioning. According to Mead, the
human mind first assumes personal, subjective knowledge of objects in
its environment.1 23 The mind uses its power of reason to order this
knowledge into attitudes, beliefs, volitions. Because at this stage the
mind does not reflect on itself as an object in the universe, all judg-
ments remain subjective; the mind is a prisoner of social forces. 124 The
118. See generally J. PIAGET & B. INHELDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHILD (1969).
119. Id. at 13.
120. K. KAYE, THE MENTAL AND SOCIAL LIFE OF BABIES: How PARENTS CREATE PER-
SONS 233-35 (1983). See also 0. DUCROT & T. TODOROv, ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY OF
THE SCIENCES OF LANGUAGE 252-53 (1979).
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transformation to higher levels of consciousness is achieved when the
mind turns back its experience on itself, viewing itself as an object in
the social process.125 This self-consciousness permits "[t]he apparatus
of reason . ..to [sweep] itself into its own analysis of the field of
experience."
26
Self-realization is not simply a passive thought process, but de-
mands that the individual interact with other individuals. 27 Self-
awareness begins as the individual views himself through the perspec-
tive of others within the same social environment or context of experi-
ence. 28 This communication process permits the individual to assume
the role of the other person with whom he interacts. The individual
"not only hears himself but responds to himself... as truly as the
other person replies to him."'' 29 He is able to direct his own process of
external and internal communication more objectively.
130
The work of Mead and the pragmatists was paralleled by Euro-
pean scholars, most notably Karl Mannheim. Mannheim drew on the
philosophic tradition of Kant and Weber to achieve similar conclu-
sions."' He believed that for an individual to achieve self-conscious-
ness, he must exercise his reason to analyze the world and his impact
upon it. As Mannheim stated, "we become masters of ourselves only
when the unconscious motivations which formerly existed behind our
backs suddenly come into our field of vision and thereby become acces-
sible to conscious control."'
132
Mannheim concurred with Mead that the development of the self
is an active, not passive, endeavor. Mannheim observed that: "[S]elf-
control and self-correction develop only when in our originally blind
125. The evolution of self-consciousness was described by Mead as follows: "Mind arises
in the social process only when that process enters into, or is present in, the experience of
any one of the given individuals involved in that process. When this occurs the individual
becomes self-conscious and has a mind; he becomes aware of his relations to that process as
a whole, and to the other individuals participating in it with him." .Id at 134.
126. Id. at 138.
127. It is widely recognized by psychologists that the two basic modes of consciousness
are passive and active. See Hilgard, Consciousness and Psychology, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL-
OGY 1, 18 (1980).
128. G. MEAD, supra note 121, at 138.
129. Id at 254.
130. American jurisprudence recognizes the importance of this process in its reliance on
the right to cross-examine witnesses in court proceedings. Witnesses are the primary sources
of information in a trial. A witness' testimony, his interpretation of reality, is only reliable
insofar as it can be reconciled with the experience of the trial participants. Through cross-
examination, the lawyer acts as both receiver and transmitter of information and ideas.
131. K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA xviii (1936).
132. Id. at 47.
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vital forward drive we come upon an obstacle which throws us back on
ourselves. In the course of this collision with other possible forms of
existence, the peculiarity of our own mode of life becomes apparent to
us."' 3 3 Described in this way, the development of self is inseparable
from the active quest for truth, 34 at least as truth is defined by Mill and
Holmes.
35
B. The Search for Knowledge
The dispute over whether truth is absolute, as Mill believed, or
simply relative, as Holmes argued, has raged for decades. At times it
has prompted legal scholars to call for abandonment of the market-
place of ideas as a First Amendment doctrine. 13 6 As we have seen, the
dominance of legal relativism in the 1940's led Meiklejohn to reject the
marketplace in favor of his system of freedom of political speech. '31 In
the 1970's, scholar C. Edwin Baker responded to what he believed was
an inordinate revival of judicial faith in absolute truth by promulgating
a libertarian First Amendment theory. 38 Baker not only defined truth
as limited to the subjective belief of the individual, 3 9 but also rejected
the marketplace of ideas for its insistence on usurping individual truth
for societal needs.'
40
The philosophical work of Mead and Mannheim presents an alter-
native to the everpresent dichotomy of absolute versus relative truth.
This alternative is the concept of a relational knowledge. Like relativ-
ism, "relationalism" assumes that truth cannot be comprehended if it
exists outside the scope of individual experience. Unlike relativism, it
posits that the individual can transcend his or her social conditioning to
achieve knowledge of the relational pattern that includes the individual
and all other worldly phenomena. The American system of freedom of
expression permits the individual to achieve relational knowledge
through the process of active communication with others in society.
The marketplace doctrine remains a workable model for framing issues
133. Id.
134. Mannheim argues that "participation in the living context of social life is a presup-
position of the understanding of this living context. The type of participation which the
thinker enjoys determines how he shall formulate his problems." Id at 46.
135. See supra notes 67-69, 83 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 57, at 964; supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
138. See Baker, supra note 57, at 990-1040.
139. Id. at 991.
140. Id. at 1006-09.
of freedom of expression insofar as it allows individuals to participate
in social communication.
Television, an intrusive audio-visual medium, both facilitates and
retards the proper functioning of the marketplace of ideas and conse-
quently the individual's search for knowledge.' 4 ' While today's televi-
sion provides the viewer with vast amounts of information otherwise
unobtainable, it neither permits viewers to respond to the communica-
tion nor encourages them to think critically about the information pro-
vided.142 As a result, viewers cannot understand the interaction
between themselves and the content of the information, the persons
providing the information, and the relationship of each to society as a
whole. Psychological research indicates that television images are
often absorbed uncritically and unconsciously into the viewer's
psyche. 143 When this occurs, the viewer's sense of reality is distorted
and he or she may confuse television images with concrete experi-
ence.'" In this respect, television does not facilitate the beneficent ex-
change of knowledge described by Mill and Holmes, but becomes a
medium of pacification and manipulation.
Public access to cable television would assist individuals in coun-
tering the effects of "television conditioning" by permitting them to en-
gage in active television communication. Public access users would
become more critical as viewers and would be better equipped to use
television to develop relational knowledge. More importantly, they
would increase the variety and diversity of information available to the
public and would provide necessary feedback to commercial television
programmers.
L The Process of Social Communication
Because human beings derive knowledge from communication, an
understanding of the basic elements of the communication process is
essential for comprehending the effectiveness of cable television access
in generating individual knowledge. The communication sciences,
known collectively as cybernetics, seek to identify those principles basic
to any communication system, whether organic (including all living
things) or man-made (especially computers).145
141. See infra text accompanying notes 167-91.
142. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
145. The term "cybernetics" was first used by Norbert Wiener to describe the mecha-
nisms that direct the flow of information. The word cybernetics comes from the Greek
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Cybernetics identifies three basic elements of the communication
process: a communication source encodes a message, transmits the
message to a receiver who decodes it, and the receiver provides "feed-
back" to the source.'4 6 Emphasis is placed on the feedback, which
modifies and guides the transmissions of the communication source.1
47
Feedback takes different forms depending on the nature of the commu-
nication activity. For example, in human communication, feedback
might be the "other half' of a conversation, the facial expression of the
receiver, or a letter to the editor.' 48 Communication scientists empha-
size that because of its modifying effect, feedback makes the process of
communication circular rather than linear.149 This model is funda-
mental to scholarly work in communications. "All representations of
communication in terms of social systems or social systems in commu-
nication terms, depend on the concept of feedback."' 150
Perhaps the most comprehensive description of the communica-
tion process is George Gerbner's General Model.' 5 ' Gerbner recog-
nizes that because the transmitter's and receiver's perceptions of
communication may differ greatly, the structure of the communication
is subject to "the creative, interactional nature of the perceptual pro-
cess."' 52 The context within which communication takes place also
greatly affects the nature of the process.153 For example, direct conver-
sation will produce results different from those produced by telecom-
munications. 15 4 Furthermore, the human communication process,
unlike mechanical processes, is always open and variable.' Transmis-
sion, reception, and feedback all depend on the coding of messages; use
of an unintelligible language or lack of access to the same medium may
hinder direct communication and cause the parties to misunderstand
each other.
While the aforementioned factors may cause people to misinter-
pret each other's meaning, Gerbner stresses that the content of commu-
kybernetes, meaning steersman. Wiener, Cybernetics, in COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE 25
(A. Smith ed. 1966).
146. D. MCQUAIL, COMMUNICATION 22 (1975).
147. Id. at 23.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 24.
151. Gerbner, Toward a General Model of Communication, 4 A.V. COM. REV. 171-99
(1956).
152. Id. at 187-90.
153. Id.
154. See infra notes 167-96 and accompanying text.
155. D. MCQUAIL, supra note 146, at 25.
nication is always "meaningful."' 56 In other words, knowledge derived
from communication should not be viewed as limited to the intentions
or perceptions of the transmitter and receiver. Rather, communication
creates a "relational pattern" of information about the structure, con-
text, language, and medium of expression. This pattern provides the
individual with basic data from which he or she may organize
knowledge.'
57
The social nature of communication is elucidated by analogy to
the impossibility of understanding a football game by watching the be-
havior of the individual players.15 8 In their famous case study of a
Princeton-Dartmouth football game,' 59 Albert Hastorf and Hadley
Cantril demonstrated that the perceptions of persons watching the
game varied greatly, despite the fact that all were participating in the
same "event." Different individuals described the collision of players
on the field differently, depending on whether they were Princeton or
Dartmouth fans, members of the press, or simply persons interested in
football.' 60 A cyberneticist would add that the event was made possi-
ble only because the participants shared certain significant concepts,
such as the rules of the game. 16 1 Each individual did not simply react
to an "object," but rather acted within a complex social system-a ma-
trix of human experience.
In its scientific approach to communication, cybernetics has estab-
lished certain fundamental principles that mirror the philosophical pro-
positions of George Mead and Karl Mannheim. In the search for a
knowledge that transcends relativism, Mead and Mannheim argue that
the central issue is not whether objective truth exists, but how individu-
als who are bound to a particular position in time and society may
develop and acquire knowledge. 1 62 It is assumed that objective knowl-
edge cannot be comprehended or even identified if it exists outside of
the experience of the individual. 163 But because the self-conscious indi-
156. Gerbner, supra note 151, at 187-90.
157. Id
158. This analogy is used in R. BIRDWHISTELL, KINESICS AND CONTEXT, ESSAYS ON
BODY MOTION COMMUNICATION 72 (1970).
159. Hastorf & Cantril, They Saw a Game, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS
COMMUNICATION 300-12 (W. Schramm & D. Roberts ed. 1971).
160. Id at 300-10.
161. Id at 310-11.
162. K. MANNHEIM, supra note 131, at 188; G. MEAD, supra note 121, at 128.
163. Mannheim observes that: "A modem theory of knowledge which takes account of
the relational as distinct from the merely relative character of all historical knowledge must
start with the assumption that there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to con-
ceive of absolute truth existing independently of the values and position of the subject and
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vidual possesses some degree of critical reason, he or she may attempt
to acquire such knowledge by first identifying the social forces that
have contributed to his or her particular beliefs and then analyzing
those beliefs within the context of further experience. Relational
knowledge is not acquired by fanciful imagining, but through the ap-
plication of critical reason to actual events.
1 64
Communication serves a dual purpose in the search for knowl-
edge. First, through social communication the individual achieves self-
consciousness and thus the ability to reason objectively. Second, com-
munication provides the "data of experience" by which the individual
can hypothesize about the world. As Gerbner, Hastorf and Cantril re-
mind us, this data is not limited to the contents of the communication,
but includes information about the relationship of individuals to each
other and to society as a whole. Furthermore, communication illus-
trates the position of the participants in "space-time" 65 since each par-
ticipant continually applies previously acquired data. Thus,
communication theorist Frank Dance writes that "the communication
process is constantly moving forward, yet is always to some degree de-
pendent on the past, which informs the present and future."'
166
2. Television and Knowledge
Although the full impact of television on the individual search for
knowledge is still unclear, some generalities may be stated. It has al-
ready been demonstrated that self-consciousness depends upon the in-
teraction of the individual with other people. 167 Critical intelligence
related to the social contest." K. MANNHEIM, supra note 131, at 79; see also G. MEAD, supra
note 121, at'260.
The impossibility of separating the individual from the observed object for purposes of
obtaining "objective" knowledge is well known to the physical sciences, especially atomic
physics. In atomic physics, the observer determines the arrangement of the experiment,
which in turn modifies, to some extent, the properties of the object. If the structure of the
experiment is changed, the properties of the observed object change as well. F. CAPRA, THE
TAO OF PHYSICS 126 (1977). In the words of physicist Werner Heisenberg: "What we ob-
serve is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning." W.
HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY 81 (1958).
164. See supra note 163.
165. According to Einstein's relativity theory, space is not three-dimensional nor is time
separate from space. Both are connected and form a four-dimensional continuum of space-
time. Because space-time is not fixed, the physical reality of both space and time (and thus
communication) is relative to the position of the observer. F. CAPRA, supra note 163, at 50.
See A. EINSTEIN, THE MEANING OF RELATIVITY 30-31 (1950).
166. Dance, A Helical Model of Communication, in FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATION
THEORY 103, 105 (K. Sereno ed. 1970).
167. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
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occurs when the individual challenges messages received and modifies
his or her own internal and external messages in response.1 68 To speak
critically, one must listen; to listen critically, one must speak. This pro-
cess is accomplished most effectively when an individual interacts di-
rectly with other human beings. Interaction allows the individual to
examine closely the communication source, his or her relationship to
the source, and the position of both in society. 169 In interpersonal com-
munication, all senses are open and used. Human and contextual fac-
tors such as gestures, intonation, temperature, odors, physical
structures, and other people constitute the concrete reality of the com-
munication experience. 170
The use of electronic media for communication necessarily alters
the natural communication process. 171 Any medium situated between
the communicating parties inherently mediates or interprets the flow of
information.17  A simple electronic medium, such as the telephone,
amplifies the voice, permitting individuals to converse over vast geo-
graphic distances. This amplification is accompanied by the reduction
of the participants from whole persons to mere voices. 173 The advan-
tage of overcoming distance is gained by sacrificing the richness of
multisensory experience. ' Telephone conversation remains concrete,
however, because its users communicate directly, sharing the sense that
transmission and reception occur at the same point in real time. 17
A more complex medium such as television is also a partial sen-
sory experience. It amplifies communication over distance, but reduces
it to two senses, aural and visual. 176 Yet unlike telephone communica-
tion, in which the participants experience real time, television tran-
scends real time, permitting the replay of a transmission for which "the
immediate life-world reference may no longer even exist." 177 In other
words, there is no feedback. To illustrate this phenomenon, Professor
168. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
169. See Duncan, Face to Face Interaction, in PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RESEARCH 1-3 (D.
Aranson & R. Rieber ed. 1979).
170. Ihde, The Technological Embodiment ofMedia, in COMMUNICATION PHILOSOPHY
AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 61-62 (M. Hyde ed. 1982).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id at 63.
174. Id
175. Persons conversing by telephone do not actually occupy the same space-time, but
perceive a shared experience of physical proximity which makes their communication "con-
crete." See Ihde, supra note 170, at 64-65. See also supra note 165.
176. Ihde, supra note 170, at 65-66.
177. Id at 66.
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Don Ihde recalls the anticigarette commercial in which an actor tells
the audience that he would be dead of lung cancer by the time they see
the commercial.1
78
Because human beings rely most heavily on their aural and visual
senses for information, 79 television events appear more real than
messages transmitted through other media. This effect is enhanced by
the use of imagery drawn from the real world. Even if the viewer
knows that the imagery portrayed on the television screen is fabricated,
he or she cannot easily separate it from reality. The viewer may think
that "it's only a movie," but the near-reality that permeates the aural
and visual senses affects the mind and emotions.' 80
The ease with which the visual sense may be fooled is well illus-
trated by the work of Adalbert Ames, Jr. His experiments indicate that
people are compelled to act on images that they know are optical ilu-
sions. Even when they are aware of an illusion, many repeated trials
are required before people learn to correct their actions to reflect what
they know to be real.' 8 ' If no effort is made to correct the image, or if
the viewer is not made aware that the image is an illusion, he or she
will accept the image as real.
Similarly, the simulated reality of television imagery intertwines
with real life imagery.' 8 2 The assassination of President Kennedy, Vi-
etnam, the first moonwalk, and Watergate were events physically ex-
perienced by only a few people. Yet, through television, those events
178. Id.
179. One reason for human beings' strong reliance on aural and visual stimuli may stem
from the importance of those senses for the development and use of language. See, e.g.,
Posner & McLeod, Information Processing Models: In Search of Elementary Operations, 33
ANN. REv. PSYCHOLOGY 477, 484-89 (1982). Aural and visual information also maintains
the individual's sense of balance and position in the environment. Johansson, von Hofsten
& Jansson, Event Perception, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 27, 50 (1980).
180. Professor Birdwhistell describes the viewer's difficulty in distinguishing film's near-
reality from the living world: "Not only does the movie and television screen reinforce, by
the very velocity of its image and sound presentation, our preconception of past, present,
and future in a single line, but only the most sophisticated are aware of the coercion of the
technology which prepares the record. It is not difficult for the thoughtful viewer or pro-
ducer to be aware of the exigencies of conscious censorship in the preparation of a script. It
is extraordinarily difficult to be constantly alert to the extent of control exerted by the focus
and the selection of the cameraman and his recording team. Close-ups feel right to exper-
ienced viewers, the shift of camera from speaker to auditor, or from speaker to speaker
seems natural, too. They influence all of us trained by Western and, particularly, American
dramaturgical conventions which see communication, the interpersonal situation, and inter-
action itself, as action-reaction sequences." R. BIRDWHISTELL, supra note 158, at 15 1.
181. See Bateson, Information, Cod'cation, and Metacommunication, in COMMUNICA-
TION AND CULTURE 418 (A. Smith ed. 1966).
182. See Ihde, supra note 170, at 67.
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became part of the reality of millions.8 3 The usefulness of those
images for an individual seeking knowledge of the world depends on
the individual's ability to analyze them critically. Critical analysis is
most easily accomplished in communications in which both transmitter
and receiver share real time. Through feedback, each party derives
critical understanding of the shared experience. With television, which
operates to disjoin communication in space-time, providing feedback is
much more difficult. Thus, critical analysis demands that the individ-
ual test the accuracy of the images presented against some concrete,
nonmedia standard: one's own experience.
1 8 4
Psychological research indicates that the ordinary human being
thinks analytically only under specific conditions of motivation.IS5 The
greatest motivation is direct human interaction. 186 The portrayal of
events through monosensory media such as the printed word or radio
encourages at least a modicum of thinking because readers or listeners
must construct their own images from the words or sounds presented;
they must draw on their own experience to make sense of the
messages.' 8 7 While they will not be able to comprehend fully the real
life situations that underlie the printed or audio reports, they will not
believe the message if it does not somehow comport with their own
experience. Acting as a writer and speaker, the average person devel-
ops a sense of the process of selecting, organizing, and presenting ideas,
and realizes that a writer or speaker represents only one person's inter-
pretation-not necessarily the "truth."
183. Marshall McLuhan has described television as an extension of the human senses
which operates to expand human perception of the world. M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING
MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 332-35 (1964). On this point, see also Roberts, Nature of
Communication Effects, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 378 (W.
Schramm & D. Roberts ed. 1971).
184. This point is well argued in Roberts, supra note 183, at 377-81. See also supra notes
157-70 and accompanying text.
185. See Katz, Psychological Barriers to Communication, in MASS COMMUNICATIONS
316, 318 (W. Schramm ed. 1960).
186. See Duncan, supra note 169.
187. Psychological research with children demonstrates that there is a difference in the
capacities of video, audio, and the printed word to stimulate or inhibit creative thinking.
Children exposed to concrete video presentations were much more likely to rely on the film's
visual images to draw inferences about its message, and were less likely to depart from or
overturn the facts and concepts presented. Children exposed to audio and print presenta-
tions made greater use of textual content, general knowledge, and personal experience in
drawing inferences. Furthermore, children who were read stories made use of the opportu-
nity to ask questions and make comments in their efforts to comprehend the story's message.
Meline, Does the Medium Matter? 26 J. CoM. 81-89 (1976); Meringoff, Influence of the Me-
dium on Children's Storytelling Apprehension, 72 J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 240-49 (1980).
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Television does not encourage people to think critically' because
the moving, life-like images on the screen do not depend on the
viewer's memory or experience for credibility. The near-reality por-
trayed on the screen leaves little room for dissent, as contrary exper-
iences are often subsumed by the immediacy of the present action. 89
The average citizen knows little about the mechanics of television.
Thus, the average viewer cannot fully comprehend the extent to which
the images that appear on the screen result from human and electronic
interpretation. This lack of understanding has been consistently re-
flected in polls conducted over the past two decades, in which Ameri-
cans found television news more credible than newspapers by a two to
one margin. 190 They believe that the camera cannot lie, but "know"
that the printed word represents only the interpretation of the writer.'91
The work of George Gerbner reveals a stable relationship between
patterns of television content and conceptions of reality held by heavy
viewers. For example, in response to the abundance of violence de-
picted on television, adults averaging four or more hours of viewing per
day were more likely than adults averaging less than two hours per day
to over estimate both the proportion of people employed in law en-
forcement activities and their own chances of being the victims of vio-
lence. 192 Furthermore, heavy viewers were less likely to feel that most
people can be trusted. 193 "In all cases, the. responses of heavy viewers
revealed a conception of the world that differs from reality but that is
characteristic of television's world. Moreover, the response withstood
controls for age, education, gender and amount of newspaper read-
ing."' 94 Similar findings were reported for children' 95 and
188. See supra note 187.
189. See supra note 180.
190. See ROPER ORGANIZATION, CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TELEVISION
AND OTHER MEDIA 4-5 (1981); Boyce & Hiraksa, A Measure of Trust, WASH. JOURNALISM
REV., Nov. 1983, at 48-50. A similar result was obtained in Atkin & Elwood, TVNews Is
First Choice in Survey of High School Students, 55 JOURNALISM Q. 596-99 (1978).
191. A most telling statement was made by one of the respondents to the Washington
Journalism Review's poll: "Being able to watch television leaves an impression-it lets you
decide for yourself." Boyce & Hiraska, supra note 190, at 50.
192. Roberts & Bachen, Mass Communication Effects, in 32 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY
307, 328 (1981). See also Gerbner & Gross, Living with Television: The Violence Profile, 26 J.
COM. 173-99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Living with Television]; Gerbner & Gross, The Scary
World of Television, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Apr. 1976, at 41-45, 89.
193. Gerbner & Gross, The Scary World of Television, supra note 192, at 89.
194. Roberts & Bachen, supra note 192, at 328.
195. Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox & Signorielli, Cultural Indicators: Vio-
lence Profile No. 9, 28 J. COM. 176-207 (1978).
adolescents. 196
Television's power to influence human thought has serious conse-
quences for the individual's search for knowledge or society's quest for
truth. When the Roper Organization recently asked a national sample
of adults where they get most of their information about "what's going
on in the world," 95% answered the mass media.'97 Of the mass media,
television is already the most pervasive, and it continues to increase its
audience at the expense of newspapers and radio. 198  The average
American household now has the television set turned on for nearly
seven hours per day, 199 a concentration far exceeding that necessary to
distort the individual's conception of reality.2"
196. Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli, Morgan & Jackson-Beeck, The Demonstration ofTower:
Violence Profile No. 10, 29 J. COM., 177-96 (1979).
197. Living With Television, supra note 192, at 319. See ROPER ORGANIZATION, supra
note 190, at 2-4.
198. Over 70 million or 98% of American households own television sets. 44 TV
FACTBOOK SERVICE 65A (1974-75). By 1982, 23 million homes were wired for cable televi-
sion. DeMartino, Promised Lana AMERICAN FILM, July-Aug. 1982, at 58. By 1983, the
number had risen to 33 million, or nearly 40% of American homes. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
1983, at 1, col. 5.
While television viewing has increased, the proportion of adults claiming to read a
newspaper every day has declined from 73% in 1967 to only 57% in 1978. J. Robinson & L.
Jeffries, The Changing Role of Newspapers in the Age of Television 31 (Journalism Mono-
graph No. 63, 1979). The decline is attributed to the decline in newspaper reading by
younger members of the population. Robinson and Jeffries discovered in a national sample
of adults that 85% of those over 60 but only 51% of adults under 29 reported reading a
newspaper the day before the survey. Id. The Roper Organization reports that each suc-
ceeding generation is more likely than its predecessor to cite television over newspapers as
its major news source. See ROPER ORGANIZATION, supra note 190, at 2-4. Furthermore,
studies indicate that young people who do not read newspapers are less likely than earlier
generations to acquire the habit as they grow older. Roberts & Bachen, supra note 192, at
313. See Robinson & Jeffries, supra; Jennings & Niemi, Continuity and Change in Political
Orientations.- .4 Longitudinal Study of Two Generations, 69 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 1316-35
(1975).
199. In 1976, the average household television set was turned on 6.8 hours per day.
Households in which the family head had achieved less than one year of college reported 7
hours per day, while those with one or more years of college reported 6.39 hours per day. G.
COMSTOCK, S. CHAFFEE, N. KATZMAN, N. MCCOMBS & D. ROBERTS, TELEVISION AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1978).
200. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has noted that
audio-video media possess a special power to influence human beings that the printed word
cannot rival. In at least one instance the Court has upheld the right of the federal govern-
ment to regulate the contents of speech which, had it been printed rather than broadcast,
would have been constitutionally protected. In FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978),
the Supreme Court upheld an FCC declaratory order prohibiting the broadcast of material
which it considered "indecent," although not "obscene"--a category of nonprotected speech.
The Court reasoned that: "First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over
the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home,
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Because society uses television to generate and disseminate knowl-
edge, individuals must be encouraged to critically analyze the medium.
Affirmative access to cable television would provide such encourage-
ment. As both access users and viewers become more involved with the
medium, they would be better prepared to comprehend the unique
character of television and its power over the human psyche.20 1 By
communicating through television, individuals would experience the
process of selecting, editing and transmitting a view of the world. To
become literate in the language of television, they would be called upon
to exercise their critical intelligence as speakers and producers. Once
able to comprehend the powers and limits of the medium, these indi-
viduals also would become more critical viewers.
20 2
As "real people" begin to appear on screens in living rooms, per-
sons long accustomed to treating television as a separate world might
awaken to the human dimension of the medium and feel compelled to
participate. Critical viewers reacting to television programming might
then provide television with feedback. In turn the commercial media
or other individuals might modify their programming. The medium
would cease to be a source of one-way communication and would be-
come a circuit. The distortion of real time that defeats direct communi-
cation need not prevent effective communication.
where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of
an intruder .... Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too
young to read." Id. at 748-49. Therefore, "the government's interest in the 'well-being of its
youth' and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in their own household justified the
regulation of otherwise protected expression." Id. at 749.
The court was careful to note that its holding was extremely narrow, limited only to
preventing a public nuisance. Yet this judicial recognition that broadcast may be regulated
on grounds other than spectrum scarcity raises the possibility that cable television may be
regulated by the federal government as an intrusive visual medium accorded special First
Amendment treatment.
201. No studies have yet been conducted analyzing the impact of the nation's existing
cable access centers on viewer behavior. See supra note 52. However, a number of viewer
education studies indicate that once persons are taught how to produce television programs,
create special effects, and identify the marketing strategy of the media, they are more likely
than others to identify elements of subjectivity, fabrication, and inaccuracy in television
programs. See Dorr, Graves, & Phelps, Television Literacy/or Young Children, 30 J. COM.
71 (1980); Roberts, Christenson, Gibson, Mooser & Goldberg, Developing Discriminating
Consumers, 30 J. COM. 94 (1980); D. Singer, Zuckerman, & J. Singer, Helping Elementary
School Children Learn About T V, 30 J. COM. 84 (1980).
202. See supra note 201.
C. Democratic Decisionmaking
1. The Active Viewer as Political Actor
Freedom of expression facilitates democratic decisionmaking by
providing the public with diverse ideas and information and by permit-
ting robust debate and discussion. As noted earlier, television can en-
hance democratic choice by bringing a large and complex world into
American living rooms."0 3 Yet by denying individuals the opportunity
to directly challenge and debate ideas that emanate from "the tube,"
television can manipulate their sense of the world and thus unfairly
influence their decisions on issues of public importance. Decades of
research indicate that while the mass media are not effective in chang-
ing people's existing views,2°4 they are extremely effective in creating
new opinions.20 5 The media cannot displace closely held views because
the heterogeneity of the mass audience prevents the media from "tai-
lor[ing] their messages to meet the particular needs and beliefs of indi-
vidual receivers."20 6 However, because the media provide the public
with information otherwise unavailable, they can influence how people
perceive and value the world.
As previously discussed, television's reduction of the world to the
aural and visual senses produces a sufficiently "real" image that the
mind is convinced of the image's authenticity. 207 At the same time the
individual is denied the richness of understanding that comes from use
of all the senses in direct, active communication. 08 Furthermore, the
time limitations placed on television programming necessitate the divi-
sion and condensation of reality into narrow segments.
The most pernicious effect of this reduction is the belief that televi-
sion portrays a sufficiently complete description of reality to warrant its
application to real life situations.20 9 For example, the televised depic-
tion of Russian soldiers parading, Iranians chanting, or Japanese scien-
tists in a computer lab can cause viewers who have never personally
203. See supra text accompanying note 142.
204. See Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 159, at 311.
205. Id. See also Roberts & Bachen, supra note 192, at 323.
206. Hastorf& Cantril, supra note 159, at 311.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 179-81.
208. See Johnson, The Communication Process and General Semantic Princies, in MASS
COMMUNICATIONS 308 (1960).
209. The evidence that television influences human behavior is substantial. In a recent
report, the National Institute of Mental Health listed over 100 studies that NIMH considers
basic reading on the proven impact of television on viewer conceptions of social reality. I
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, SUMMARY REPORT, TELEVISION AND BEHAV-
IOR: TEN YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 62-66 (1983).
Summer 19841 CIRCUMSTANCES WITHIN OUR CONTROL
586 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 11:551
experienced such phenomena to imagine that all Russians, Iranians
and Japanese conform to those images. Such identification also occurs
when television projects images that are linked indirectly to the indi-
vidual's real-life experience. 210 For example, an individual may have
limited experience with persons who vote Democratic, who purchase
consumer goods, or who are female. Yet television portrayal of "Dem-
ocrats," "consumers" and "feminists" can create new groupings of sym-
bols that are only partly based on experience. Projecting these symbols
onto real situations is the essence of stereotyping.21 I By unconsciously
accepting two-dimensional images as real, a viewer fails to differentiate
between individual phenomena and overemphasizes their general
similarities.21 2
One of the most obvious effects of stereotyping is the excessive
tendency to formulate issues and situations in a two-valued, or bipolar,
manner.21 3 People are evaluated as good or bad, right or wrong, Com-
munist or anti-Communist, and so on. Bipolar thinking also creates
binary relationships for things that actually exist on a continuum. For
example, youth is set against age, wealth against poverty, mind against
matter.21 4 Such thinking poses an obvious problem for a democratic
society: "With such an orientation, there are only two sides to any
question, and one of them is to be rejected. This is the formula of
conflict: the number of choices is reduced to two, and a choice is in-
sisted upon. 2 5 As the world's complexity and ambiguity disappear
from view, so does the potential for consensus and compromise. Fac-
tionalism becomes the norm.
Meiklejohn envisioned a democratic system in which the electo-
rate made decisions objectively-for the good of the collective rather
than out of pure self-interest. Such a system depends on the ability of
voters to enlarge their field of vision beyond the social forces that deter-
mine their personal conduct. The roots of personal needs, desires, and
ethics must be examined critically in light of the individual's position in
time and society. In achieving awareness of the social determinants
that dominate their lives, individuals remove such factors "from the
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Johnson, supra note 208, at 309; Katz, supra note 185, at 323. Empirical studies of
the cognitive functions which cause humans to accentuate similarities and minimize differ-
ences among categories are reviewed in Tajfel, SocialPsychology of Intergroup Relations, 33
ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 1, 20-24 (1982).
213. See Johnson, supra note 208, at 312-13.
214. G. BATEsON, STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND 95-96 (1972).
215. Johnson, supra note 208, at 313.
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realm of unconscious motivation into that of the controllable, calcula-
ble, objectified." '216 The application of critical reason enhances choice
and decision. The individual no longer drives blindly ahead, but con-
sciously considers the meaning and consequences of his or her ac-
tions.217 Mannheim writes:
It is at this point, if any, that politics can become a science, since
on the one hand the structure of the historical realm, which is to
be controlled, had become transparent, and on the other hand
out of the new ethics a point of view emerges which regards
knowledge not as a passive contemplation but as critical self-ex-
amination, and in this sense prepares the road for political
action.218
As discussed earlier, critical self-examination is the product of ac-
tive communication with others in society.2 19 Because television has
become a part of nearly everyone's life, active communication in that
medium by the individual might facilitate self-realization.22 ° By be-
coming literate in the television medium, individuals would become
more discerning viewers. They would become aware of the extent to
which their beliefs are derived from television and would be able to
submit those beliefs to conscious control.22 1 Future messages from the
media would be more carefully examined and would be less likely to
slip unnoticed into the individual's psyche.222
2 Inadequacy of the Fairness Doctrine
As the role of the viewer changes from observer to participant, he
or she is less likely to project media stereotypes. However, the problem
of stereotyping and subsequent thought polarization can be combatted
most successfully by demonstrating to the viewer the diversity and
complexity of the world. 2 3 The concept of maintaining diverse view-
points has been part of the Supreme Court's First Amendment program
216. K. MANNHEIM, supra note 131, at 190.
217. Mead explains that "the essential characteristic of intelligent behavior is delayed
responses-a halt in behavior while thinking is going on." G. MEAD, supra note 121, at 254
n.7.
218. Y. MANNHEIM, supra note 131, at 191.
219. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
220. Research indicates that the motivation to learn and participate in the discussion of
issues is enhanced by the presentation of conflicting viewpoints. See Donahue, Tichenor &
Oliver, Mass Media and the Knowledge Gafp: .4 Hypothesis Reconsidered, 2 COM. RESEARCH
3 (1975); Genova & Greenberg, Interest in News and the Knowledge Gap, 43 PuB. OPINION
Q. 79 (1979).
221. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 198-99.
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for several decades.22 4 Indeed, the strictures of the Fairness Doctrine
are aimed at providing the public with "conflicting viewpoints. ' 225 Un-
fortunately, the Fairness Doctrine suffers from both theoretical and
practical flaws.
The doctrine requires the media to identify opposing views, a task
interpreted by the media to mean that they must portray "both" sides
of an issue. Because the Fairness Doctrine requires only bipolar re-
porting, it does nothing to counter the uniformity of the modem press.
Research indicates that professional journalists tend to produce similar
stories.226 This congruence is explained "as a function of commonly
held news values, similarity in organizational structure and procedures,
and most importantly, common dependence on a limited number of
information sources.1
227
It is well documented that the television news programs derive
most of their news content from newspapers, especially papers of rec-
ord such as the New York Times and the Washington Post.22 8 Conse-
quently, the practices of the newspaper reporter are important to an
understanding of the Fairness Doctrine. In one of the most thorough
works in this area, Leon Sigal examined the news process of the Times
and Post.2 29 He discovered a close relationship between stories re-
ported and the ease with which such stories were gathered. Sigal
grouped information sources into three channels: routine, informal,2 0
and enterprise. Routine channels represented low cost news sources
such as press conferences, headings and written press releases. Enter-
prise channels included first-hand observation of events and independ-
224. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) in which the Supreme
Court stated that the First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wel-
fare of the public." Id at 20. See also Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 253-
57 (1974) (newspaper diversity); Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-27 (1973) (broadcast diversity); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440
U.S. 689, 709 (1979) (cable diversity).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
226. Gandy, The Economics of Image Building: The Information Subsidy in Health, in
COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 204, 221 (E. McAnany ed. 1981). See generaly
L. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS (1973).
227. See Gandy, supra note 226.
228. E. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE 34 (1973). On the influence of the New York
Times on television news practices, see L. BROWN, TELEVISION: THE BUSINESS BEHIND THE
Box 223-25 (1971).
229. L. SIGAL, supra note 226.
230. Sigal's "informal channel" is the background briefing in which an official meets
with a select group of reporters to discuss issues in an informal setting-for example, over
dinner or drinks. Background briefings have one common element: statements made by the
official are considered "off the record." Id at 111-15.
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ent research. Not surprisingly, of approximately 3,000 stories
published in the two papers, nearly sixty percent came from routine
sources while only twenty-six percent came from enterprise sources.
231
The government is the principal source of information in the rou-
tine channels.2 3 2 More than 20,000 persons are employed in govern-
ment public relations, a system which "arranges tours, sets up exhibits,
sponsors aerial events, schedules speakers, offers press interviews and
press briefings, transmits radio programs around the world and
bounces pictures off .. satellites. 233 Because television news re-
quires setting up equipment and moving crews of technicians, televi-
sion relies more heavily on routine government sources than
newspapers do.234
It would be a gross exaggeration to claim that the media do not
exercise discretion and integrity in their pursuit of stories and that they
are simply a dependent, helpless arm of the government. Press cover-
age of the plight of blacks in the South greatly assisted the civil rights
movement, contrary to the will of many government leaders; television
brought Vietnam home, to the chagrin of three presidents; and Water-
gate was uncovered by diligent, tireless reporting. Yet, despite much
"enterprise" reporting, the government has tremendous influence over
the press agenda, which in turn molds the public agenda.
Since controversy is, by convention, essential to news, and since
most journalists subscribe to the notion of objectivity, newspaper and
broadcast content generally are biased in favor of stories for which two
sides can be found and quoted.235 In our two-party system, the govern-
ment that sets the public agenda is either Democratic or Republican.
Under the Fairness Doctrine, presenting opposing views within the
public agenda means presenting the position of the other party. Thus,
showing "both" sides still reduces the world to bipolar simplicity and
does little to demonstrate the multiplicity of interests-conservative,
liberal, libertarian, and socialist-that attach to any issue. Rather than
increasing diversity in the presentation of news programming, the Fair-
ness Doctrine reinforces the status quo. Moreover, to maintain
power236 and implement policy objectives,23 7 governments of both par-
231. Id. at 121.
232. Gandy, supra note 226, at 222.
233. Bonafede, Uncle Sam: The Flimflam Man7 WASH. JOURNALISM REV., Apr./May
1978, at 66.
234. E. EPSTEIN, supra note 228, at 31.
235. M. Saggese, The Journalist's Creed 2 (1979) (unpublished manuscript).
236. Congressional influence on the FCC is another threat to freedom of expression.
Between 1970 and 1977, more than 30 congressional committees and subcomittees reviewed
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ties have repeatedly used the Fairness Doctrine to further their already
substantial agenda-setting authority.
138
FCC policies. E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 86
(1978). Many of the investigations focused on the content of television programming. One
CBS documentary entitled "The Selling of the Pentagon" became the subject of an inquiry
by the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee. Subcommittee
Chairman Rep. Harley Staggers demanded the documentary's out-takes (unused film) to
determine whether CBS had distorted interviews with government officials. Id. at 83. CBS
President Frank Stanton refused to turn over the film and was threatened with contempt of
Congress. Although the resolution finding Stanton in contempt was defeated in the House,
Congress had come within a few votes of punishing a journalist for exercising his constitu-
tionally protected rights. Id.
237. The great potential for abuse has been abundantly clear since the creation of the
Fairness Doctrine. Three Presidents of the United States have conducted active campaigns
to gain support for their policies and attack their opponents through the Fairness Doctrine.
President Kennedy first used the Fairness Doctrine in 1963 to counter conservative opposi-
tion to his proposed nuclear test-ban treaty with the Soviet Union. F. FRIENDLY, THE
GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 34-35 (1976). To insure ratifi-
cation by the Senate, the administration organized a coalition of private citizens to under-
write the production of pro-treaty programming. Whenever anti-treaty pronouncements
were aired by the broadcast media, the Kennedy coalition demanded equal time to reply.
Id The treaty passed overwhelmingly, and a valuable new weapon had been discovered.
In 1964, the Democratic Party, with Lyndon Johnson as its presidential candidate, be-
lieved that it faced a formidable challenge from Republican Barry Goldwater. Fearful of
the influence of right-wing radio stations, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) es-
tablished a monitoring system to track broadcast programming around the country. It also
encouraged officials and organizations to demand equal time and raised $250,000 to produce
and sponsor anti-Goldwater programming. This strategy garnered the Democrats a total of
1,678 hours of free airtime to promulgate their views. In a report to the DNC, Martin E.
Firestone, a former staff member of the FCC and an advisor to the DNC, reported that
"[e]ven more important than the free radio time was the effectiveness of this operation in
inhibiting the political activity of these right-wing broadcasts .. " F. FRIENDLY, supra, at
41-42 (quoting Confidential Memo from Martin E. Firestone to Wayne Phillips 4 (Oct. 28,
1964)). Firestone stressed that by requiring local stations to grant equal time, a financial
burden was attached to their coverage of political issues. Id.
President Nixon, long fearful of an antagonistic press, sought to control what he be-
lieved was unfair criticism of his administration. E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note
236, at 61 n.82. White House aides proposed an "official monitoring system through the
Federal Communications Commission" to identify broadcast bias, S. SIMMONS, THE FAIR-
NESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 219 (1978), but settled instead for creating the President's
Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) to influence FCC decisionmaking. E. KRAS-
NOW & L. LANGLEY, supra note 236, at 60. Clay T. Whitehead, OTP's first director, called
for an end to "ideological plugola" in the news by restricting "so-called professionals...
[who] dispense elitist gossip in the guise of news analysis." F. FRIENDLY, supra, at 201.
Whitehead proposed to accomplish this by holding local television stations responsible for
the content of network programming and denying license renewals to those "who fail to act
to correct imbalance and consistent bias from the networks." Id.; see also E. KRASNOW &
L. LANGLEY, supra note 236, at 61. While such a licensing scheme was not instituted, one
high ranking FCC staff member admitted to a Congressional subcommittee that the Com-
mission is "easily overwhelmed by the power, prestige, and influence of the President."
238. See supra notes 236-37.
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The media are not inclined to ask the citizenry what they think the
agenda should be; the media claim that privilege for themselves. In-
deed, the media resist public access to their facilities precisely because
of the average individual's alleged ignorance of the standards of profes-
sional journalism.239
Even if the Fairness Doctrine were a workable method of achiev-
ing diversity in programming, it is limited to political speech. Yet
political values result from cultural conditioning involving a vast range
of issues and events. For example, everything portrayed on televi-
sion--situation comedies, athletic events, soap operas, commercials,
news programs, gameshows-potentially contributes to an individual's
view of the world.
Because broadcast frequencies are allocated so sparingly, the aver-
age broadcast licensee maximizes its profits by presenting news and en-
tertainment programming that attracts the broadest possible audience;
diversity is sacrificed for a homogenized program format.24 In theory,
cable television's abundance of channels creates a natural economic in-
centive for "narrowcasting," i.e., devoting each channel to a specific
topic or audience.24' Advocates of cable television deregulation com-
monly argue that narrowcasting will provide sufficient programming
diversity to satisfy societal needs and that individuals will have an
equal opportunity to sell programming to cable operators.242
Although cable systems provide many channels, cable operators,
as corporate fiduciaries, will inevitably purchase and transmit only
profitable programming.2 43 Thus, in a cable system without access
channels, diversity simply means the s'tisfaction of the preexisting
tastes of several segments of the audience, rather than those of the au-
dience as a whole.2" Views held by a minority of persons that do not
239. BROADCASTING, Sept. 24, 1979, at 48. See also supra note 99 and accompanying
text.
240. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 21, at 35.
241. B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 138 (1976).
242. See, e.g., Rein, Quale, Bayes & Logan, The Constitutionality of the FCC'S Television-
Cable Cross-Ownershop Restrictions, 34 FED. COM. L.J. 1, 29-48 (1982).
243. See, e.g., Hughes, Simulation of a CATV System's Financial Results, in PRACTISING
LAW INSTITUTE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CATV AND PAY TELEVISION 23, 25-26
(1977).
244. The homogenization of cable programming was reported on the front page of the
New York Times on Nov. 24, 1983. W. SHEPERD & C. WILCOX, supra note 21, at 368, argue
that intensely felt program preferences are not recognized because viewers cannot respond
directly to existing programs, rating services do not accurately reflect viewing, and viewer
purchases only vaguely respond to program content and advertising, despite the industry's
intention to transmit "profitable programming."
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have the potential to sell advertising will never be admitted to the me-
dium. Because the development of critical judgment and political
knowledge demands that individuals transcend their prejudices, a sys-
tem that limits the presentation of ideas to those which are most profit-
able cannot transcend government by self-interest.
A recent national survey indicates that the public currently per-
ceives its primary role as a receiver of information. Although most
people may not use the mass media to express themselves, they over-
whelmingly support the right of others to do so.245 More than three-
quarters of those surveyed support laws requiring both equal coverage
for all candidates and the presentation of all sides of controversial is-
sues.2 46 At the heart of the listening public's commitment to diversity is
its eagerness to exercise its own right to be informed.2 47
The listening public would benefit greatly from a general right of
access to cable television. Such access would facilitate dissemination of
many points of view, enhancing the public's ability to acquire knowl-
edge. Instead of relying on the professional media to interpret other
people's views, the public would be presented with the words and
images of those citizens themselves. Confronted with a new complexity
of broadcasting, the audience's natural tendency to think in a stere-
otypical, bipolar manner might be reduced. 48 This increased aware-
ness of diverse choices might then permit audiences to make more
informed and better reasoned decisions.249
D. Societal Stability
Justice Holmes was not alone in his belief that freedom of speech
provides for societal stability. Justice Brandeis gave eloquent expres-
sion to that belief when he wrote:
[O]rder cannot be secured merely through fear of punish-
ment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed griev-
ances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones.z5 °
245. J. IMMERWAHR, J. JOHNSON & J. DOUBLE, THE SPEAKER AND THE LISTENER: A
PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 47 (1983).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 27-28.
248. See supra notes 208-15, 220 and accompanying text.
249. The result would be similar to that envisioned by Meiklejohn. See supra notes 84-
93 and accompanying text.
250. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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In concurring with Brandeis, the public has expressed its over-
whelming support for the right of unpopular minorities to be heard
through the mass media.251 By a two to one margin, Americans sur-
veyed believe that in the United States Communists have a right to
express their beliefs on television, that homosexuals have a public right
to contest laws they feel are discriminatory, and that members of the
Nazi party have a right to publish their views."' 2 As Emerson tells us,
America's goal is governance by reason, not by coercion.
253
Society's most effective means of constructively channeling dissent
is not simply reasoned argument, but also fulfillment of the individual
citizen. The First Amendment does not guarantee that individuals will
be provided with all material resources necessary for realization of
their potential as human beings. However, by providing the right to
self-expression, acquisition of knowledge, and information necessary
for collective decisionmaking, the First Amendment's system of free-
dom of expression permits individuals to achieve their needs and
desires. Citizen access to cable television would promote individual
fulfillment and societal stability by allowing greater self-expression,
knowledge, and participation in government.
Now that Congress has permitted the states to require access to
cable television, the courts will be called upon to articulate a legal
structure that recognizes access as a central goal of the First Amend-
ment. A model for a workable First Amendment scheme is available in
the federal courts' public forum doctrine.
E. The Public Forum Doctrine
The Supreme Court has long held that the protection of individual
expression warrants the imposition of an affirmative duty on the part of
government to guarantee access to certain public facilities for the pur-
pose of speech activity.2 54 Once a public forum has been established,
government may restrict speech activity in only three ways. First, it
25 1. J. IMMERWAHR, J. JOHNSON & J. DOUBLE, supra note 245, at 27.
252. Id
253. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
254. The term "public forum doctrine" was coined by Professor Harry Kalven to identify
a series of Supreme Court decisions authorizing public access to certain publicly owned
facilities. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv.
1. On the development of the public forum doctrine, see also Homing, The First Amendment
Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 93 1; Comment, Access to State-Owned Communica-
tions Media-The Public Forum Doctrine, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1410 (1979); Note, The Public
Forunm Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REv. 117
(1975).
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may regulate time, place and manner of the speech to the extent neces-
sary to facilitate orderly use of the forum and to preserve the facility's
other functions.255 Second, government may prohibit speech which is
not constitutionally protected,256 such as obscenity. Third, certain cate-
gories of protected speech which are considered to be of "adult" inter-
est may be regulated so as to prevent their exposure to children.257
The public forum doctrine operates as a safety valve for dissent
through its emphasis on equal access.258 The Supreme Court has held
255. In upholding a city ordinance requiring persons to obtain a license to parade on the
streets, the Court stated that: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would
be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public
highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the
means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. . . . As regula-
tion of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional exercise of control by
local government, the question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as
not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the
communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated
with resort to public places." Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
256. The Supreme Court has held that the government may prohibit expression in order
to satisfy the following goals:
(1) State security: See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion and is likely to incite or produce such action");
(2) Personal reputation: See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
283 (1964) ("[t]he Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for
libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official con-
duct. . . [by] requiring proof of actual malice");
(3) Personal privacy: See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,487
(1975) ("there is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual, a zone within
which the State may protect him from intrusion by the press, with all its attend-
ant publicity");
(4) Administration of justice: See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-63
(Cox 11) (1965) ("[a] State may adopt safeguards. . . to assure that the admin-
istration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence ....
[Such safeguards do not] infringe upon the. . . protected rights of free speech
(5) Public morality: See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,737-41 (1977);
Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973) ("obscene material is not
protected by the First Amendment .... ");
(6) Truth in commercial speech: See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)
(state may regulate content of advertisement for optometry services).
257. See supra note 200.
258. In Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Supreme Court held that:
"There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas."' Id. at 96 (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1948)). "[G]overnment must afford all points of view an equal
opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some
groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of
what they intend to say." Mosely, 408 U.S. at 96.
that "government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which is-
sues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. 259
Since the 1930's, the Supreme Court has gradually developed the
concept that certain public property is so traditionally associated with
the exercise of First Amendment rights that it cannot be closed to pub-
lic expression. For example, streets, sidewalks, and parks have been
designated as public forums.2 60 Within the past fifteen years, the Court
has expanded this doctrine to include facilities that do not resemble
traditional public forums, provided the activity is not inconsistent with
the facility's normal functions z.2 6  The federal courts have been liberal
in designating communications media as public forums, whether they
are publicly owned 262 or operated as public utilities.
2 63
The time has come to update the public forum doctrine to the tele-
vision age. The power of audio-visual communication to captivate
human thought is evident. Few Americans have watched television
and not felt its electric touch. No other medium is so effective at capti-
vating audiences by penetrating their emotions. Social communication
259. Mosely, 408 U.S. at 96.
260. The public forum doctrine was first stated by the Supreme Court in Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496 (1939): "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens." Id. at 515. See also Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969) (use of city street); Adderley v. Flor-
ida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) (use of city street); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963) (use of state capitol); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (use of city
street); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (use of city street).
261. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the Supreme Court upheld an
antinoise ordinance that prohibited the intentional creation of a disturbance on public
grounds adjacent to a school, but permitted peaceful picketing that did not interfere with
normal school activities. The Court stated that the "crucial question is whether the manner
of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time." Id. at 116. See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 552-58 (1975) (municipal board's denial of use of city theater for production of alleg-
edly obscene play is prior restraint).
262. The courts have applied public forum analysis in the following cases involving com-
munications media. Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977)
(public high school information system); Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 441 F.2d
1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (state university-owned newspaper); Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool,
324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (Texas State Bar Journal); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp.
102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (public high school student newspaper).
263. Kissinger v. New York City Transit Auth., 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (city
subway station); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982,
64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967) (motor coaches).
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demands that both speaker and listener share the language of commu-
nications,264 and television has become America's primary media lan-
guage.265 Use of the streets and parks for expression without the
assistance of telecommunications facilities is only partially effective
and does not adequately serve the goals of the First Amendment. 266 If
society is to attain those goals through television, it cannot rely solely
on the commercial media. Rather, channels should be opened for pub-
lic use; the screen must become the modem town square.
IV. Cable as a Public Forum
As a natural monopoly, cable television is an economically scarce
speech resource.267 Cable television is also physically limited by the
nation's system of utility poles and underground conduits. 268 More im-
portantly, cable television's use of the public right-of-way is integral to
its function as a medium of expression. A cable system's physical plant
permanently resides within the public domain. While the coaxial
cables are owned by private corporations, it is the public that possesses
the right to use those cables. With its economic and physical scarcity
and permanent use of the public domain, cable television merits
designation as a public forum.
While newspapers belong to the private sector, cable television
owes its existence to the public largesse. Like cable television, broad-
cast television depends on the public domain, thus permitting its classi-
fication as a public forum. The Supreme Court, however, has refused
to grant a public right of access to broadcasting. 269 The Court contends
that such access would potentially sacrifice too much of the broad-
caster's airtime, which is limited to 148 hours per week.270 Technology
has alleviated this problem for cable television. A cable operator's po-
tential program time is approximately 8400 hours per week, delivered
over fifty channels.271
264. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
266. As Justice Brennan stated: "[F]reedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On
the contrary, the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective
forum-whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a
radio and television frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of communications
the right to speak would ring hollow indeed." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. See supra note 21.
268. Id
269. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 94.
270. Id. at 124-26.
271. Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. REv. 85, 86 nn.5-6 (1982).
While affirmative access requirements might decrease the broad-
caster's return on capital, such requirements need not seriously impair
either the cable operator's editorial or financial integrity. Committing
two or three separate channels to public access would not impinge
upon the cable operator's own expression, since it would be free to
devote the other channels (approximately 7400 hours per week) to its
own programming. Public forum analysis would prohibit the govern-
ment from applying content regulation like the Fairness Doctrine to
cablecasting. Consequently, the First Amendment rights of the profes-
sional media would be enhanced rather than inhibited.2 72 To insure
fair pricing and adequate delivery of services, only the business opera-
tions of cable systems would be subject to public utility regulation.
Moreover, in the interest of developing the cable medium to its fullest
possible extent, access requirements could be balanced in order to max-
imize both public demand and operator profit.2 73
Because cable systems are confined to geographically limited ser-
vice areas,274 demand for access need not exceed the demands now
placed on other community facilities. Even if all citizens within a given
market area seek access to the cable forum, the allocation of two or
three channels should be sufficient to accommodate the demand. For
example, in a service area of 50,000 people, the devotion of three chan-
nels to public access would produce 26,280 hours of program time per
year, enough to put every citizen on television for a half hour.
Conclusion
Citizen access to cable television is the subject of heated debate
both in Congress and among the public. At the heart of the argument
lies the tremendous influence of television on human thought and be-
havior. At risk are the fundamental goals of the First Amendment
freedom of speech: self-fulfillment, the search for knowledge, the
272. The use of public forum analysis is consistent with Professor Emerson's conviction
that government may use its power to create structures that promote speech, but may not
regulate the content of speech articulated through or within those structures. Emerson, The
Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 803-04 (1981).
273. For example, to assure an attractive rate of return, the cable operator might be
permitted to spread the cost of public access channels to all cable subscribers. Alternatively,
state and local governments might allocate a portion of taxes paid by cable operators to
support access. Ithiel De Sola Pool makes the argument for a system of low price leased
access in his TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 181-86.
274. Conventional cable systems using coaxial cables and periodic amplifiers have well
defined geographic limits. Thermal noise produced along each segment of the system cre-
ates "snow" in the television picture. The longer the cable, the more noise is produced.
Deichmiller & Kent, Fiber Opticsfor CATJ' OPTICAL SPECTRA, Sept. 1981, at 42.
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maintenance of democracy, and the evolution of a stable, yet flexible
society. Because the current system of television programming and
regulation thwarts fulfillment of these goals, a general right of affirma-
tive citizen access to cable television has become a practical and consti-
tutional necessity.
Access to the cable medium might contribute to the development
of self-realization by permitting citizens to participate in meaningful
communication with others. Increased citizen participation in the me-
dia might facilitate the search for knowledge, since individuals would
further develop their critical faculties and widen their realm of ideas.
Access might also enhance citizen involvement in the political process:
individuals might be encouraged to enter public debate, permitting
them to make better decisions on important issues. Finally, society
might be provided with a meaningful safety valve for dissent, as citi-
zens could express grievances in a peaceful, orderly manner with assur-
ance that their message would reach a significant proportion of the
population.
